GH019-07
Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed Conflict: State of Knowledge and Directions for Research

Wednesday, 16 December 2020: 04:30
Virtual
Katharine J Mach1, Neil Adger2, Halvard Buhaug3,4, Marshall Burke5,6, James D. Fearon5, Christopher B Field7, Cullen Hendrix8,9, Caroline Kraan1, Jean-Francois Maystadt10,11, John O'Loughlin12, Philip Roessler13, Jürgen Scheffran14, Kenneth A. Schultz5 and Nina von Uexkull3,15, (1)University of Miami, Miami, FL, United States, (2)University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom, (3)Peace Research Institute Oslo, Oslo, Norway, (4)Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway, (5)Stanford University, Stanford, CA, United States, (6)National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, United States, (7)Stanford University, Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford, CA, United States, (8)University of Denver, Denver, CO, United States, (9)Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, CO, United States, (10)University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium, (11)Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom, (12)University of Colorado at Boulder, Geography, Boulder, CO, United States, (13)William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA, United States, (14)University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany, (15)Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
Recorded Presentation
Abstract:
In this presentation, we report on a comprehensive and balanced assessment of the relationship between climate and conflict risks and its implications for future directions of research.

Research findings on the relationship between climate and conflict are diverse and contested. Based on the judgments of experts representing a broad range of disciplines and analytical approaches, we have assessed current understanding. The assessment is structured around the importance of climate as a driver of organized armed conflict within countries, changes in conflict risk across climate futures, and implications for conflict risk reduction and climate change adaptation.

Across experts, best estimates are that 3–20% of conflict risk over the last century has been influenced by climate, and none of their individual ranges excludes a role of climate in 10% of conflict risk to date. There is agreement that climate variability and change shape the risk of organized armed conflict within countries. However, other drivers are judged substantially more influential for conflict overall, and the mechanisms of climate–conflict linkages are a key uncertainty. Intensifying climate change is estimated to increase future conflict risk as additional linkages become relevant, although uncertainties also expand.

Synoptic understanding of the climate–conflict relationship is important even if climate’s role is relatively minor among the drivers of conflict. Given that conflict has pervasive detrimental human, economic, and environmental consequences, climate–conflict linkages, even if minor, would significantly influence the social costs of carbon and decisions to limit future climate change. The assessment has pointed to the different ways climate may interact with the major drivers of conflict risk.

Crosscutting priorities for future directions of research include (1) deepening insight into climate–conflict linkages and conditions under which they manifest, (2) ambitiously integrating research designs, (3) systematically exploring future risks and response options, responsive to ongoing decision-making, and (4) evaluating the effectiveness of interventions to manage climate–conflict links. The implications of this expanding scientific domain unfold in real time.

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