Dual Principal-agent Incentive Mechanism of Irrigation Efficiency Paradox in Arid Area

Abstract:

Abstract. The combination of increased water use and climate change has exacerbated the shortage of water resources, and restricted the sustainable development of arid regions. Saving agricultural water is the key to the construction of water-saving society. However, in the process of applying the high-efficiency water-saving technology, the paradox of irrigation efficiency appeared, that is, the utilization efficiency of agricultural water resources increased, but did not bring the expected agricultural water-saving. To address this problem, this study analyzes the internal mechanism of the phenomenon of water-saving paradox in irrigation, establishes a model of water-saving rebound effect in irrigation to measure the strength of the paradox. A dual principal-agent incentive model for irrigation water-saving process was then developed to coordinate the interest conflicts among heterogeneous stakeholders. Based on the case analysis of Shenwu Irrigation District, it can be seen that incentive and regulation should be combined to restrain the paradox of irrigation water-saving, some suggestions on optimizing agricultural water-saving management are put forward.

Keywords: the Paradox of Irrigation Efficiency, Rebound Effect, the Dual Principal-agent Incentive Mechanism