The Debtor Must Still Eat: Credit, Contracts, and the Politics of Borrowing in Postcolonial Ghana

From 1957 to 1965, Ghana’s public debt jumped from practically zero to an estimated £300 million ($840 million). While economic histories have focused on the business of decolonization and the financing of large development projects undertaken by Ghana’s first President Kwame Nkrumah, less is known about how Ghana’s new leaders managed foreign creditors and the accumulation of an ever-increasing debt. By examining the interactions between government officials, private businessmen, and representatives from financial institutions like the I.M.F and the World Bank, I demonstrate how negotiating debt and proving creditworthiness dominated Ghana’s international relations throughout the 1960s and 70s. Because the terms and conditions of borrowing were never clear-cut, and creditworthiness is never simply about economic calculations, the social and cultural contexts in which judgements about Ghana’s creditworthiness were made and refuted are also crucial to my research. Through evoking colonial histories, demanding fair rates and deferment, and contesting predatory contracts, I argue that the Government of Ghana refused to be considered a “bad” borrower and challenged the moral assumptions on which such a label rested— lack of honesty, reliability, and integrity. Although Britain remained Ghana’s largest creditor, proving creditworthiness was an international affair that included several governments, from Israel and Japan to the United States and West Germany, and had implications beyond Ghana. As sources reveal, creditors worried that Ghana debt negotiations would set a precedent and shape future claims by other former colonies. By centering the role of Africans in shaping the policies and logics that guided international negotiations, my research also shows how histories of global debt and credit are embedded within social structures and relations.