FOCUS, Objective, and Simple Actions Have Changed Perception and Culture Concerning Process Safety At Monsanto

Abstract:

<>Monsanto do Brazil - São Jose dos Campos plant is comprised of robust and solid programs to prevent accidents to its employees and partners. In the last five years, it has had a TRR (Total Recordable Rate) of 0.3.

However, as it is a Chemical Industry in the Herbicide segment, it needed to increase its level of Human and facilities reliability, and in 2006 it started to seek excellence in Process Safety. 

            To achieve that excellence, Monsanto understood it was necessary to change the view, the attitude, and, as a consequence, the culture concerning Process Safety of its employees and partners. Based on this premise, over the last six years, new programs have been created, the existing programs have been upgraded, bringing innovation into trainings for the operational level, Engineering and medium management, besides benchmarking visits to companies with solid base in Process Safety.

In this new phase, financial resources have been better targeted in projects and changes, ensuring a better reliability of the facilities, moving toward the new culture that was being created.

             The main “Triggers” that changed the history of Monsanto São Jose dos Campos regarding the understanding, perception, and attitude in relation to Safety Process were:

·         Development of the RMP (Risk Management Program)

Until 2006, the company neither had a written, documented Risk Management Program, nor recognized what the fundamental “Elements” for the Safety Process Management in the site were.

Those elements were based on the Norm P4. 261, rev. 2003 of CETESB, and on Monsanto Corporate Requirements.

With the development of the RMP, those fundamental “Elements” that were only part of the Integrated Management System (IMS) were grouped and included in the Risk Management procedure, and a PDCA (Plan, Do, Check and Action) cycle was created for each of them. With this organized structure, all the employees and partners were trained, becoming able to recognize and identify each Element as part of the Safety Process, and not only as a simple procedure of the Management System.

·         Theoretical and practical training on Process Risk Analysis – Forming Leaders

Until 2007, Process Risk Analysis were confused with Task Risk Analysis, in other words, as the Industrial Safety culture was very strong, the evaluated risks were falls, cuts, contusions, etc. For a new concept of inherent risk to the productive process be introduced into the site, a theoretical training was provided to all the process engineers focusing on HAZOP (Hazard Operability) and PRA (Preliminary Risk Analysis) tools, including failure modes of productive systems. During the PHA (Process Hazard Analysis) of each area, the responsible engineer of the area, who had been trained in the theoretical part, had sixteen hours of risk study tutored by a qualified professional, putting into practice all the concepts learned in the theoretical part of the training, developing the Leader of the PHA in this way.

·            PHA Schedule

       The development of the PHA schedule of five (5) and ten (10) years enabled a long term vision of the Process Risk Analysis of each productive area, as well as the introduction of this Target into the Objectives and Targets spreadsheet of the unit, and into the document of Targets of the participants of the risk study in question. This measure was important for the commitment of the involved ones, and for the quality of the analysis.   

·            MOC - Management of Change

In the phase of changing culture, one of the most important procedures was of the Management of Change, since the projects and changes in the productive processes were and are made on a routine basis. Without a solid base, a strong evaluation of risks, and updates of documents, all the efforts to change the perception of risks and the culture would fail. Based on it, a robust risk evaluation Check list, and an electronic database of all the documents of the unit were created, as well as a position of administrator of that system, in which the responsible persons for the projects and changes only conclude their work after updating all the documentation impacted by the change. Documents did not use to follow the changes made in the productive unit.

·         PSM (Process Safety Management) Committee

The PSM committee is comprised of Process, Electrical, Mechanical, and Safety Process Engineers aiming to share good practices among productive areas, analyze the applicability of incidents occurred internally or externally to Monsanto, develop or revise procedures and programs in order to assure the integrity of the facilities and technical expertise of the involved ones. Two-hour meetings are held monthly.

·         Theoretical and Practical training for Operational level

Safety Process trainings offered to the operators consist of theoretical and practical parts. In the theoretical part, films of the CSB (Chemical Safety Board) are shared aiming to analyze the applicability and recycling of the procedures. In the practical part, the training occurs in the field, in the productive area, showing “in loco” the risk scenarios, or in the training Practice Academy, where there are fictitious stations to simulate a real activity, as well as the inherent risks. By means of this practice, it was possible to speak about Safety Process without subjectivity, but with actual examples of the operators' daily activities.

·         Indicators of PSM

The indicators of PSM were developed based on the Elements considered as critical for the integrity of the facilities, as well as to increase the perception of the importance of those elements.  The indicators are shared monthly by medium and high management, who in turn help keeping the Targets of the indicators.  Those are:

a-    Preventive: Overdue maintenance plans of Mechanical Integrity, Not due PHA recommendations, Not provided PSM training, MOC open for ninety (90) days, Overdue Operational Instructions with more than one (1) year; Not due PSM Audit recommendations

b-    Reactive: PSI (Process Safety incident), PSIR (Process Safety Incident Rate), and PSSR (Process Safety Severity rate)

Conclusion

            With the efforts made and work performed over these six years, Monsanto has developed greatly its knowledge and vision, and its employees and partners have been showing change in the culture of Safety Process. It can be evidenced through the excellent result of the external PSM Audit with only eight recommendations, zero overdue PHA actions and PSM audit, zero overdue maintenance plan of Mechanical Integrity, and only one Safety Process accident in 2011, without material losses and damages to people or facilities, presenting only contention loss. (PSI = 1).