In June 2013, a reboiler that was isolated from its pressure relief valve catastrophically ruptured when heat was applied to it during an operations activity. Two operations personnel were killed. An investigation into the incident found that a series of process safety management program deficiencies over the 12 years leading to the incident caused the reboiler to be unprotected from overpressure. Weaknesses in the site’s Management of Change (MOC), Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR), and Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) programs contributed to the incident. This paper discusses lessons learned from the 2013 reboiler overpressure incident at the Williams Geismar Olefins Plant, which was investigated by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board.
See more of this Session: Case Histories and Lessons Learned - GCPS Joint Session
See more of this Group/Topical: Global Congress on Process Safety
See more of this Group/Topical: Global Congress on Process Safety
