In Praise of Polymathy. Peirce and art historical thought.

Rather than for his theory of signs or his ‘pragmatism’, it is for his polymathic approach to knowledge that the figure of C.S. Peirce offers a compelling model for art historical practice. Peirce pioneered and contributed to numerous fields including mathematics, psychology, history of science, metaphysics, evolutionary theory, aesthetics, and the fields of logic and semiotics for which he is best known. His polymathy (Greek polumathēs, “having learnt much”, from polus “much” and mathe “learning”) did not only consist in a wide range of references, but in an approach more invested in boundary-defying problematisation than in specialisation. This approach bears relevance for current reflections on art history’s modes of thought, reflections which have acquired particular potency with recent calls for its ‘decolonisation’. Indeed, the chequered history of polymathy, which reached its height in the 17^th century, is bound up with the history of the emergence of the modern University in the West. With the emergence of academic specialisation and professionalisation, polymathy was increasingly viewed with suspicion. Today, with the continued demand for art historical approaches that can challenge the Western foundations of the discipline, polymathy resurfaces as a notion with critical power. A polymathic approach to art history is one where thought ranges across cultural and discursive traditions, foregrounds new relations between diverse fields of study, decentres specialisms, and combines intellectual approaches to produce scholarship that can displace the Euro-American canon. Peirce’s work invites us to interrogate the presumptions of art historical thought by reinventing the figure of the thinker.